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Abstract
The literature on the micro-economics of the eco-industry often assumed interiority
of pollutant net emissions. In a perfectly competitive nal good market vertically
integrated with an upstream monopoly supply this assumption implies that an optimal
tax is always greater than its associated marginal social damage. In this short note we
will relax this assumption and challenge that result. The market structure generates
a unique threshold on the scale of the marginal social damage, whereby for any value
above the threshold an optimal tax is strictly lower and net emissions are zero.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that our modern lifestyles and their associated production of goods and
services have a major impact on our environment. Beginning with Pigou (1920), a rst
literature strain has addressed the question of fair mitigation of social costs by implementing
policy tools likewise Coase (1960) and Buchanan (1969). This was the rst step toward
environmental awareness. As regulation alone proved to be unable to bring sustainability,
opportunities arose for the private sector to prot from the demand for monitoring and
waste management. This has led to the emergence of the eco-industry, which has grown
continuously ever since.
Some institutions commissioned extensive studies on these eco-industries. For instance
the European Commission created a large-scale program to inventory the distribution of such
rms in the European Union and their global performances for more than fteen years. In
a report on their ndings, Ecorys (2009), they states that:
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"However, there are groups operating on a global scale, and which are not con-
strained by the local nature of the needed resources. [...] A preliminary analysis of
the micro-economic sample indicated that the eco-industry is a well concentrated
industry with 10% of the companies responsible for almost 80% of the operating
revenue/turnover."
Then in another report Ecorys (2012) they state:
"The global market for eco-industries is estimated at roughly EUR 1.15 tril-
lion a year (2010 gures for turnover) [...]. There is also broad consensus that
the global market could almost double, with the average estimate for 2020 being
around EUR 2 trillion a year".
These observations of highly protable and concentrated market have inspired the sub-
sequent literature, now addressing questions on the eco-industry itself. Likewise David et
al. (2005)(2010)(2011), who take market power as a given and suggest the optimal design of
environmental policy within this context. Building on this seminal work, Canton et al.(2008)
and Schwartz et al. (2014) propose models that combine fair pollutant emission mitigation
and imperfect competition. The present work is mostly inspired by the work of Canton et
al. (2008), which generalizes Barnett (1980) to a scenario with a vertical production chain.
They nd that an optimal tax should be less stringent to the less competitive sector for
the upstream eco-industry derives its demand from emission regulation. However, while they
suppose that net emissions are positive at the optimal solution, their model allows greater
reduction than emission if the marginal environmental damage of pollutant emission and
henceforth the policy tool are su¢ ciently dissuasive.
Here we stress the positivity of net emissions. Such that now the demand of pollution
abatement is kinked, revealing a shift in the production regimes. It appears, when the less
competitive sector is the upstream eco-industry, the optimal tax scheme is set higher or
lower than the marginal damage of pollution if the marginal damage itself is lower or higher
than an implicit threshold. This result is contrary to those of Canton et al. (2008). For
our nding applies when the less competitive market is the upstream one, this note focuses
on the aspects of monopoly competition from upstream. Where an eco-industry means a
rm providing an abatement good used in the production process of customers to reduce
pollutant emissions.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows, section 1 describes the vertically
integrated eco-industry setup. Section 2 highlights the kinked demand for pollution reduction.
The section 3 resolves the upstream monopoly outcome. Then Section 4 concentrates on
welfare analysis and policy recommendations.
2 The Vertically Integrated Eco-Industry
Consider a nal good Q and assume that Q is produced by a large set of producers in a
perfectly competitive downstream market. To give substance to this denition suppose each
individual production generates increasingly (and convex) pollutant emission " (Q) where
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each unit is taxed at rate  . To reduce this burden the producers purchaseA abatement goods
supplied monopolistically at increasing (and convex) production cost K (A) and retailed at
price PA. Quantied in emission unit, the consecutive reduction  (A), is increasing and
concave such that pollution reduction is lower or equal to emission. Accounting for increasing
and convex production cost C (Q), the cost function of a downstream representative agent
so is C (Q) +  max (0; " (Q)   (A)) + PA  A.
This positivity constraint on net emissions has been neglected until now by the literature.
Intuitively the use of a maximum function will generate a discontinuity in the marginal prot,
which would normally imply a kink. Likewise a constant marginal damage1  applies on net
emission in the social benet, thus the environmental damage is  max (0; " (Q)   (A)).
The tax  is chosen by a benevolent planner to maximize the social benet by mitigating
both environmental damage and market power of upstream rm. Finally, to close the model,
demand is dened by an inverse function of the quantity PQ (Q), which is strictly decreasing.
In the following we dene the decision of the agents and the market equilibrium.
3 The Kinked Abatement Demand
In this section we present nal good market equilibrium quantity and abatement demand for
any upstream supply and any tax. To do this we solve of the games maximization programs
by backward induction. Precisely, prior to the present section the government had set a
welfare maximizing tax   and the upstreammonopoly anticipated the demand for abatement
and has accordingly chosen a prot maximizing supply quantity A (). Afterwhich on
downstream market the representative agent trades competitively the quantity Q ( ; A),
given by:
max
A>0

max
Q>0
fPQ Q  C (Q)   max (0; " (Q)   (A))g   PA  A

such that PQ = PQ (Q) when market clears
To illustrate the resolution let us rst suppose strictly positive net emissions at the optimal
solution " (Q)   (A) > 0. In this case the prot maximization is separable. When
downstream market clears its unique maximizer veries the rst order conditions: (1)
marginal market revenue per marginal emission equates tax and (2) inverse demand for
abatement equates marginal environmental costs reduction.
 (Q) :=
PQ (Q
)  C 0 (Q)
"0 (Q)
=  (1)
PA (A
 ()) =   0 (A ()) (2)
This is a well known result found in David M. and Sinclair-Desgagné B. (2005) and
developed in Canton J., Soubeyran A. and Stahn H. (2008) and Schwartz S., Stahn H.
1Another possibility could have been to consider increasing convex damage function. In such case the
result would be the same and the reasonning on  would have been on marginal damage evaluated in null
emission instead.
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(2014), where the end-of-pipe assumption allows us to consider separability, from now on
we will refer to it as the interior production regime since it applies to a situation in which
net emissions are strictly positive.
Consider now the case in which " (Q)   (A)  0. Obviously if an optimal A could have
been strictly greater than  1 (" (Q)) then marginal prot would have been negative, a
contradictory statement; which limits the range of demand for abatement such that
A =  1 (" (Q)). In this case, separability is relaxed, a solution satises: (3) net emission at
the optimal solution is null and (4) inverse demand of abatement equates marginal market
revenue of nal good clean production.
Q = " 1 ( (A)) (3)
PA (A
) = 
 
" 1 ( (A))

0 (A) (4)
Equations describe a kink in the inverse demand of A such that (1) and (3) both are true,
the quantity of abatement equating for any tax level optimal pollutant emissions and
reduction Ak (), strictly negatively correlated with the tax.
Proposition 1 The kinked inverse demand for abatement is (2): equal to marginal
environmental costs reduction if A is relatively low, then (4): equal to saturated
downstream net revenue, after the kink Ak () :=  1
 
"
 
 1 ()

equating both such that:
8A > 0 : PA (A) = max
0B@0;min
0B@  0 (A) ;   " 1 ( (A))0 (A)| {z }
:= (A)
1CA
1CA (5)
4 Taxation Regime and Monopoly Outcome
Proposition 1 allows us to compute the monopolys anticipation by replacing (5) into the
monopolys program:
max
A>0
fA PA (A) K (A)g
If a unique strictly positive maximum exists, it corresponds to one among three equilibria.
Note that the inverse demand is piecewise di¤erentiable, so we can compute its derivative.
It is comprised of three parts: the rst describes marginal prot in the interior regime, then
an undi¤erentiable point on the kink quantity and nally the last part is marginal prot
when the production of abatement and nal good grow jointly.
For the interior regime, let us present the marginal prot at a quantity below the kink.
Dened for any tax level, the unique root of this functional is A1 () such that:
0 (A1 ()) + 00 (A1 ()) A1 () = K 0 (A1 ()) (6)
Since A1 () is indeed interior if and only if A1 () < Ak (), it applies only if marginal
prot evaluated at full depollution is negative, a condition equivalent to positive net
emission at the optimal solution. Running implicit function theorem on this equation it
appears A1 () is strictly increasing with respect to  . However the function Ak () is
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decreasing. The analysis of the di¤erence between the two states shows that there exists a
unique T1 tax level equating both. And therefore any tax level greater than T1 nullies the
net emission at the optimal solution.
A1 () > Ak (),  > T1 (7)
Otherwise, for any abatement quantity greater than the kink, the production of nal goods
Q saturates along the production of A. The inverse demand becomes  (A), this production
regime implies a new formula of marginal prot to the right of the kink, dening another
unique root A0, now invariant with respect to  since there is virtually no emission:
 (A0) + A0 
0 (A0) = K 0 (A0)
Where A0 is not a global maximum if this denition of marginal prot is negative when
evaluated at the kink, in other word if A0 is lower than the kink:
Ak () := 
 1  "   1 () > A0 ,  < T2 :=   " 1 ( (A0)) (8)
Proposition 2 The kink in the inverse demand is an equilibrium if marginal prot is both:
positive for any quantity below (7) and negative for any quantity above (8)
A () = Ak () :=  1
 
"
 
 1 ()
,  2 [T1; T2]
For any tax level lower than T1, the unique prot maximizer follows from equation (6) and
is A1 () < Ak (). And nally for any tax greater than T2 the unique prot maximizer is
A0. Incidentally we have identied a policy trap since markets do not respond afterward.
This way we can dene market equilibrium for any positive tax level such that:
A () = max (A0;min (Ak () ; A1 ()))
Q () = max
 
" 1 ( (A0)) ; 
 1 ()

5 Policy Recommendation
In this section we dene a welfare criterion including the market equilibrium supply
functions and derive from it an optimal tax for any damage of pollution. Say a benevolent
central planer wants to maximize the social benet of production by implementing a
positive tax on emission and assume there exists a unique solution to this program:
max
>0
8<:WF () :=
Q()Z
0
PQ (u) du  C (Q ()) K (A ())   max (0; " (Q ())   (A ()))
9=;
Convex optimization allows for the use of simple intuition here; when the marginal
criterion is positive the evaluated point is sub-optimal, inversely if the marginal criterion is
negative the evaluated point is super-optimal. Indeed WF () is piecewise di¤erentiable,
made of three relevant parts. First when  < T1, applying (1) and (6), denitions of market
equilibrium in the interior regime :Q =  1


( )

and A = A1


(+)

gives us the
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following marginal welfare, decreasing strictly positive when evaluated at the minimum
between  and T1:
[(   )] "
0   1 ()
0
 
 1 ()
 + [    (1  "0)] 0 (A1 ()) @A1
@
> 0 (9)
where e0 :=
A 0 (A)
00 (A)
Lemma 1 If optimal net emissions are strictly positive ( < T1) then an optimal tax is
greater than marginal damage (  > )
More precisely this result also means that if marginal damage is greater than T1 an optimal
tax is not lower than T1. Now let me show you why is it useless whatever higher marginal
social cost is to continue raising the tax, that leading to a lower than marginal damage
optimal tax.
When  2 (T1; T2) equilibrium xes on the kink. In which case Q following (1) has the
same equilibrium properties, although now A saturates along Ak , and according to (7) in
this range Ak is lower than A1 so that we can sign marginal prot as:
@WF ()
@
j2(T1;T2) :=
 
   K
0  Ak ()
0 (Ak ())
!
 "
0   1 ()
0
 
 1 ()
 < 0 (10)
Indeed in such case the environmental externality nullies and the only worry of the
regulator becomes consumers surplus maximization. Otherwise there is a policy trap when
 > T2 =
PA(A0)
0(A0)
that is any tax level greater than saturated price of pollution reduction.
Obviously super-optimal according to the last inequality
Proposition 3 The market structure and the e¢ ciency of abatement allows us to consider
two kind of marginal social damages. Such that if the optimal net emission level is null
then an optimal tax is strictly lower than its associated marginal damage, following
inequalities (9) and (10) which applies only if the production of Q is too much hurtful:
8 > T1 :   = T1 < 
Oppisingly by Lemma 1 we recover Canton, Soubeyran and Stahn (2008) conclusion that if
an optimal level of emission is positive an associated optimal tax should be greater than
marginal damage:
8  T1 :   2 [; T1]
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6 Conclusion
To conclude, the present note explored the question of optimal taxation when the
eco-industry is imperfectly competitive. Naturally one shall recommend a tax mitigating
pollutant emission and the provision compression exerted by the monopoly as in Barnett
(1980). Throughout this note I convinced you that public regulation of the most damaging
industries should always be less of an obstacle than marginal social cost. Precisely, you
were shown, that for any marginal damage of pollution greater than an implicitly dened
constant called T1, an optimal tax is lower than marginal damage, contradicting the
optimal taxation scheme suggested by Canton et al. (2008); which is recovered for any
marginal damage lower than T1.
Long story short the said constant denes the edge of two production regimes. The rst is
referred as "interior" for the monopolistically supplied abatement level is not high enough
to cover the whole emissions. In that case, an optimal marginal tax on emission is set
higher than marginal damage with the intention to boost pollution reduction. It happens
that the greater is the marginal social cost of pollutant the greater should be abatement
joint with the lower should be the production of nal good so that market equilibrium net
emissions are decreasing. Given that rm-sized pollution reduction e¤ort is lower or equal
to emission then implies a kink in the abatement demand, itself optimal when the marginal
social cost of emission is too large. Hence the second regime. Indeed in such a case the
environmental externality nullies and the only worry of the regulator would then be
downstream production, still decreasing with respect to the tax.
As the study was focused on the kink and its implications to the optimal tax scheme, we
did not investigate some natural extensions such as increasing convex marginal damage of
emission, downstream and/or upstream oligopoly or a permit market for pollution rights.
In the case of increasing convex social damage of emission, I foresee it could give the same
result if marginal damage evaluated in 0 emission would nevertheless be greater than T1, a
condition we could still see t to the most damaging productions (such as nuclear waste or
contaminated water).
Considering oligopolies downstream and upstream both would only bring tedious
computational work to the intuition and require that the upstream mono/oligopoly is the
less competitive sector for the result to stand. Once again, as suggested in Canton et al.
(2008).
Alas it could not resist in a permit market model, any positive quantity of permits
naturally extends to interior regime. Since net emissions and tax are negatively correlated
we would nd by construction a "well-behaved" demand for permit, but in the case we are
concerned with, the most damaging productions, we foresee that we would nd an
indetermination for the trading price of abatement and permits both when the quantity of
permit supplied by state is null.
Proofs of the Market Equilibrium
In a ve steps demonstration we search for existence and characterization of market equilibrium in the
treated programs. First step dene the convex envelop of optimal nal good production and abatement
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demand as a function of  and PA. Then secondly, steps 2 and 3 are respectively the demonstration of
existence and characterization market equilibrium as a function of the tax. The next step, the fourth
extensively dene regime shifting across the kink. Finally step 5 stresses the critical role of the max
function.
step1) Downstream
In this rst step we search for existence and characterization of nal good production and abatement goods
demand:
max
A>0

max
Q>0
fQ PQ   C (Q)   max (0; " (Q)   (A))g  A PA

If we assume PQ (Q), 0 (A) strictly decreasing and C 0 (Q), "0 (Q) strictly increasing we imply strict
concavity of the program, rst order conditions give the optimum. Let us suppose an interior solution (if
the borderslimits behave rightfully), then if we apply the method of Rockafellar (1997) with subgradient
@D:
@QD =
8<: PQ (Q)  C
0 (Q) if Q < " 1 ( (A))
[PQ (Q)  C 0 (Q)    "0 (Q) ; PQ (Q)  C 0 (Q)] if Q = " 1 ( (A))
PQ (Q)  C 0 (Q)    "0 (Q) if Q > " 1 ( (A))
The optimum is such that : 0 2 @QDjQ=Q(;A) , Q ( ; A) = min
 
 1 (0) ;max
 
" 1 ( (A)) ;  1 ()

@AD =
8>><>>:
  0 (A)  PA if A <  1
 
"
 
 1 ()

  0   1  "   1 ()  PA if A =  1  "   1 ()

 
" 1 ( (A))

0 (A)  PA if A 2
 
 1
 
"
 
 1 ()

;  1
 
"
 
 1 (0)

 PA if A   1
 
"
 
 1 (0)

Pose  (A) = 
 
" 1 ( (A))

0 (A), this function is continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing.
0 = @ADjA=AD(PA;) , AD (PA; ) = min

  1 (PA) ; (0)
 1  PA


step2) Upstream solution existence
max
A>0
fAmin (  0 (A) ;  (A)) K (A)g
Assume K 0 (A) strictly increasing, if A 
0(A)
 (A) >  2 and A
000(A)
00(A) >  2 both are true for any choice of
A 2 R+ then we ensure strict concavity of this program.
step3) Upstream solution characterization
Suppose the unique solution is interior and let us concentrate on A 2  0;  1  "   1 (0) since we have
seen downstream any quantity higher would not be traded. On this space, rst order conditions give the
optimum if we apply subgradient @AU :
@AU =
8<:
1 (A) :=   0 (A) +A   00 (A) K 0 (A) if A 2
 
0;  1
 
"
 
 1 ()

2
 
 1
 
"
 
 1 ()

; 1
 
 1
 
"
 
 1 ()

if A =  1
 
"
 
 1 ()

2 (A) :=  (A) +A  0 (A) K 0 (A) if A 2
 
 1
 
"
 
 1 ()

;  1
 
"
 
 1 (0)

Let us call A1 () and A0 the unique value of A 2 R+ such that 1 (A1 ()) = 0 and 2 (A0) = 0
0 = @AU jA=A() , A (PA; ) = max
 
A0min
 
 1
 
"
 
 1 ()

; A1 ()

step4) Regime shifting
Finally let us remark @A1()@ =   
0(A)+A00(A)
00(A)(2+"00 ) K00(A) > 0, moreover by construction
A1 (0) < 
 1  "   1 (0) which implies there exists an unique T1 > 0 such that
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A1 (T1) = 
 1  "   1 (T1), and also by construction A1    " 1 ( (A0)) > A0 , T1 <   " 1 ( (A0))
the tax level such that A0 =  1
 
"
 
 1 ()

.
step5) Generalization
Obviously the case without the max (0; " (Q)   (A)) function which enforces complementarity simply
extends the solution functions when  < T1 for any value of  2 R+.
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